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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario. 1 The most powerful democratic nation
in the world is going about its daily business in troubled times without
'Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, Springfield,
Massachusetts. The author thanks Larry Cunningham and Patricia McCoy for their comments on
an earlier draft of this paper. The author also thanks Robyn Carollo for her excellent research
assistance. This Article is an elaboration ofa presentation given at Western New England College
School of Law on the Legal Responses to Terrorism, September 20, 2002.
IThis introductory material is inspired by a column written by Jared Diamond not long after
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immediate concern for homeland safety. Its major city, arguably the world
capital of finance and culture, bustles with activity. The citizens of that
nation and that city feel reasonably secure, protected by oceans from the
tumult in other, less stable, places.
Now imagine that city is subjected to a surprise terrorist attack. Without
warning comes a shocking attack completely outside the norms of human
behavior. Fanatics send airborne bombs smashing into landmarks, striking
fear into the hearts of the populace.
This was the scene in London, England 1940. 2 The terrorists were the
Nazis launching aerial attacks into civilian targets in densely populated
areas. The German attacks were not consistent with the existing law of war.
They were not tactical strikes designed to knock out key facilities or to
disrupt the British war effort. Instead, the bombs were tossed willy-nilly
into populated areas for the primary purpose of terrorizing the citizenry and
demoralizing the nation. The attacks were so unconventional that we might
legitimately classify them as acts of terrorism.
the events of September 11, 2001. See Jared Diamond, Keeping Panic at Bay, N.Y. nMES, Oct.
21,2001, § 4, at 15.
2The complacency of England in the years leading up to World War II is captured by George
Orwell in the closing paragraph of his account of the Spanish Civil War, Homage to Catalonia.
As the narrator returns home after seeing the fighting in Spain, the book concludes:
And then England-southern England, probably the sleekest landscape
in the world. It is difficult when you pass that way, especially when you are
peacefully recovering from sea-sickness with the plush cushions of a
boat-train carriage under your bum, to believe that anything is really
happening anywhere. Earthquakes in Japan, famines in China, revolutions in
Mexico? Don't worry, the milk will be on the doorstep tomorrow morning,
the New Statesman will come out on Friday. The industrial towns were far
away, a smudge of smoke and misery hidden by the curve of the earth's
surface. Down here it was still the England I had known in my childhood:
the railway-cuttings smothered in wild flowers, the deep meadows where the
great shining horses browse and meditate, the slow-moving streams bordered
by willows, the green bosoms of the elms, the larkspurs in the cottage
gardens; and then the huge peaceful wilderness of outer London, the barges
on the miry river, the familiar streets, the posters telling of cricket matches
and Royal weddings, the men in bowler hats, the pigeons in Trafalgar
Square, the red buses, the blue policemen-all sleeping the deep, deep sleep
of England, from which I sometimes fear that we shall never wake till we are
jerked out of it by the roar of bombs.
GEORGE ORWELL, HOMAGE TO CATALONIA 231-32 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1952)
(1938).
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Why did the Nazis wage a terrorist war? They did so for the same
reason terror has been a part of warfare since the dawn of humankind
terrorist tactics often work. 3 As part of a military strategy, terrorism adds a
psychological warfare component to the rest of the attack. The terrorist
hopes the target population will panic and become its own worst enemy.
When a terrorist act generates a sufficiently terrified response from the
target population, the members of that population can be crippled by fear;
their society may even self-destruct as fear disrupts normal interactions and
leads to the abandonment of long-held societal norms based on trust and
security. Therefore, in light of the way terrorism works, the most effective
counter-terrorist act is for the target's political leadership to shore up public
confidence and help prevent the population from panicking. In times of
terrorist attack, leaders must remind their citizens of their deep collective
resolve to see the crisis through.
This is exactly what the British did in 1940. Winston Churchill
repeatedly addressed the people in terms designed to steel the nation's
resolve. 4 To back up the Prime Minister's words with action, the British
deployed a number of highly visible and very noisy anti-aircraft guns
around London and near the English Channel. Although military experts
knew the big guns had a very low chance of actually intercepting the
German aerial campaign, they also intuitively understood that the terrorist
strategy is most effective in demoralizing a population when it appears that
the target's government is incapable of responding to protect its people
against the threat. 5
This is how terrorist warfare works. Like the terrorist attack itself, the
countermeasures against terrorism have a psychological value far out of
proportion to their effectiveness. During the Battle of Britain, the people of
England did not self-destruct because their leaders' response to the
psychological warfare was on target. Their implacable Prime Minister kept
3 See ALAN M. DERSHOWlTZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT,
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 6 (Yale Univ. Press 2002) (providing a perspective on how
terrorist acts by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have been quite effective in
promoting the Palestinian cause); Brad E. O'Neill, The Strategic Context ofInsurgent Terrorism,
in TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS & POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL CONTROL 77 (Henry
H. Han ed., 1993) (discussing various strategic considerations in terrorism).
4For example, in his first statement to the House of Commons as Prime Minister on May 13,
1940, Churchill stated, "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and
hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival." BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 620 (Justin Kaplan ed., Little Brown & Co., 16th ed. 1992).
5See Diamond, supra note I.
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a brave face, and the noisy, visible anti-aircraft guns stood in bold defiance
of the German air attack.
Fast forward to September 11, 2001. Again fanatics sent airborne
bombs smashing into landmarks in the largest cities of the most powerful
nation on Earth in violation of the norms of human behavior and the laws of
war.6 The destruction of the World Trade Center towers and the attack on
the Pentagon had a huge psychological effect on the United States. As
reprehensible, cold-blooded, and inhumane as these terrorist acts were, they
were brilliant strategic moves. The attacks had the capacity to terrify the
most important cities in the world. They almost succeeded, but the people
of New York and Washington did not buckle; instead they rallied.
Like Churchill before them, key government officials-President Bush,
Governor Pataki, and Mayor Giuliani-knew they had to be highly visible
and reassuring? They discharged that duty admirably. The approval
ratings of all three shot skyward. Yet lurking in the back of people's minds
in the immediate aftermath of the attacks was a keen sense of helplessness
and vulnerability. The political leaders knew that if left unaddressed, the
terrorists could exploit those thoughts of vulnerability for further disruption
of the social order.
Knowing the lessons of previous terror campaigns, after September 11
the government had to act to show the people the United States was not
entirely helpless against the terrorist threat. Bringing the terrorists "to
justice" would have been an excellent way to make that demonstration.
Unfortunately, fighting the human combatants in a terrorist war is
extraordinarily difficult. Although the United States did eventually take
military action, neither Mullah Mohamed nor Osama bin Laden have been
captured. In the psychological war, military action alone would not give
6For a general analysis of the question of whether the acts of September II were "acts of
war," see Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. I (2003); Noah
Feldman, Choices ofLaw, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 457 (2002).
7Following Churchill's example, if not his oratorical style, President Bush rallied the people
through highly visible photo ops. For example, on September 14, 2001, just three days after the
attack, President Bush visited Ground Zero to address the men and women aiding in the rescue.
He stood aboard a fire truck accompanied by dirty and tired firefighters, emergency servicemen
and construction workers. One of the construction workers yelled out: "We can't hear you." And
the President, raising his bullhorn, yelled: "Well, I can hear you; the whole world hears you. And
pretty soon those evildoers will be hearing from us." See Press Release, Office of the Press
Secretary, President Receives World Trade Center Bullhorn, Remarks by the President During
Presentation of World Trade Center Bullhorn, The Oval Office (Feb. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/2002/02/20020225-4.html.
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the kind of reassurance required to keep our citizens on a solid
psychological footing.
The government needed to open new fronts in the "War on Terrorism"
to assure the people that something could be done to stop the terrorists. In
the month following September 11, the government took dramatic action,
such as cracking down on immigration and rounding up terrorism suspects
without full attention to civil rights. In addition, perhaps to show that it
could do something, the government ratcheted-up the money laundering
rules to make terrorist financing more difficult.
President Bush responded on September 24, 2001, less than two weeks
after the attack, with Executive Order 13,224 to freeze the assets of and
prohibit transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism. s The order also picked up a very nebulous group of
persons who are "otherwise associated" with any designated terrorist. 9 The
White House maintained that the order gave the Treasury Department
power to "block the U.S. assets of, and deny access to U.S. markets to,
foreign banks who refuse ... to freeze terrorist assets."IO Such a sweeping
power is an unconventional position, because as a matter of international
law the idea of "guilt by association" seems at odds with the notion that
nationals of neutral countries have the right to maintain commercial
relations with the belligerents in a war. II
The United States soon rallied international support for tougher
world-wide money laundering standards. The G-7 finance ministers agreed
on September 25, 2001 12 to pursue a comprehensive strategy to disrupt
terrorist financing and implemented an action plan on October 6, 2001.\3
At a meeting on October 29 and 30, 2001, the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), an international intergovernmental anti-money laundering body

8See generally Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001) (hereinafter
"E.O. 13224").
91d. § 1(d)(ii).

IOPress Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Executive Order
on Terrorist Financing (Sep. 24, 2001), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topicaUpoUterror/01092
413.htm.
llMark Kantor, The War on Terrorism and the End ofBanking Neutrality, 118 BANKING L. J.
891,895 (2001).
12Statement ofG7 Ministers ofFinance (Sep. 25,2001), available at http://www.g7.utoronto.
ca/finance/fmO 10925 .htm.
13Statement ofG7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Oct. 6, 2001), available at
http://www.g7toronto.ca/finance/fml00601.htm.
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associated with the G-7, agreed to develop special guidance for financial
institutions to help detect the techniques and mechanisms of terrorist
financing. 14
On the home front, efforts to dry up the sources of terrorist financing
culminated in the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act l5 (Patriot Act). The
law's title is an almost Orwellian acronym for "Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism.,,16 Title III of the Patriot Act is the International
Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of2001. 17
Although it appeared to be a response to the terrorist attacks, the proposed
law was not new. Precursors of the various components of the Patriot Act,
including the money laundering provisions, had been floating around
Congress for years prior to September 11, 2001. 18 Concerned about reports
that the federal approach to terrorism was fragmented across several
agencies with little coordination, and that intelligence and law enforcement
agencies had inadequate resources, Congress held hearings on enhanced
money laundering rules prior to 2001. Proponents of the legislation did not
make the case for its passage. Largely due to civil liberties concerns,
Congress did not pass legislation to resolve the problems that would

14Press Release, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, FATF Leads
International Effort to Combat Terrorist Financing (Oct. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org.
ISUniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18, and 31 U.S.C.) [hereinafter USAPA).
16A reporter for the Financial Times characterized the Patriot Act as being "coercively"
named. Patti Waldrneir, Inside Track: Unaccustomed Warriors: A New Law in the United States
Will Draft Thousands ofBusinesses into the Fight Against Terrorism, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002,
at 17.
17There have been several excellent summaries of the provisions in Title III of the Patriot Act.
See, for example, Paul Schott Stevens & Thomas C. Bogle, Patriotic Acts: Financial Institutions.
Money Laundering and the War Against Terrorism, 21 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 261 (2002); Todd
Stem et aI., The Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, 119
BANKING L.J. I (2002).
18For example, H.R. 3886 was a bipartisan proposal before the House Banking and Financial
Services Committee in June of 2000. See generally International Counter-Money Laundering Act
of 2000, H.R. 3886, 106th Congo (2000). The legislation would give the Secretary of Treasury
additional tools to root out international money laundering havens, used to funnel dirty money into
the legitimate international financial network. It was defeated. Press Release, James A. Leach,
Chairman, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, Opening Statement on Markup of HR
3886 (June 8, 2000), available at http://financialservices.house.govlbanking/6800Iea.htrn.

2003]

BRINGING OUT THE BIG GUNS

961

ultimately be addressed in the Patriot ACt. 19 The events of September 11,
however, provided a convenient justification for the passage of the law.
The Patriot Act was enacted with remarkably little deliberation. The
huge anti-terrorism package, covering 350 different subject areas and forty
different agencies, was pushed through Congress in less than a month. The
law was hammered out in private negotiations between the Justice
Department and party leaders; there were no final hearings to allow
dissenters a voice in the process, no committee reports, no conference
committee, and indeed, most members of Congress did not even have the
opportunity to read the legislation,zo
Just one Senator, Russell Feingold of Wisconsin, and only sixty-six
representatives voted against the ACt. 21 While the 342 page Act passed
overwhelmingly, representatives across the political spectrum had grave
concerns about the potential abuse of power and loss of privacy. 22 President
Bush signed the legislation into law on October 26, 2001, less than six
weeks after the September 11 attacks. Shortly thereafter, news reports
giving dollar figures for terrorist assets seized domestically and around the
world began appearing in various media outlets, suggesting the battle
against terrorism being waged by the financial services industry was being
won by the United States. 23

19 J ake
Taper, Don't Blame it on Reno, (Jan 2, 2002), available at
http://www.archive.salon.comlpolitics/feature/2002/01/02/reno.
2°Robert A.
Levy, The USA Patriot Act:
We Deserve Better, available at
http://www.cato.orglcurrentlterrorismlpubs/levy-martial-law.html. The accelerated timetable of
five weeks bypassed the committee process and floor debate. Proponents of the legislation
claimed the streamlined adoption process was necessary to prevent future attacks feared to be
imminent. See Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Congo (Sept. 24, 2001), available at www.house.gov/judiciaryI75288.pdf.atI5. The overall hazy
understanding of what was being pushed through Congress was aggravated by the fact that many
lawmakers and their staffs were preoccupied with the anthrax contamination in congressional
offices, many Congressman not able to return to their offices, and therefore, had less or no time to
consider the legislation fully. See Gia Fenoglio, Jumping the Gun on Terrorism?, 33 NAT'L J.
3450 (2001), available at 2001 WL 25926351.
21 Robert E. Pierre, Wisconsin Senator Emerges as a Maverick; Feingold, Who Did Not Back
Anti-Terrorism Bill, Says He Just Votes His Conscience, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at A8.
22 Amy Borus, When Right and Left See Eye-to-Eye, Bus. WK., Nov. 5,2001, at 88 (noting
that the opponents of the Patriot Act included ultra-conservative Rep. Bob Barr and ultra-liberal
Rep. Barney Frank).
23 See, e.g., Glenn R. Simpson, u.s. Says al Qaeda Has Begun to Feel Financial Squeeze,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15,2001, at A28.
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This Article addresses the question of whether the money laundering
provisions in the Patriot Act will be effective tools in the effort to intercept
terrorist financing to prevent future attacks like those suffered on September
11, 2001, or whether the legislation is instead the modem equivalent of a
big noisy anti-aircraft gun-psychologically useful for showing that
something is being done, but not very effective in actually doing the task.
This Article concludes that the Act's money laundering provisions will not
be effective in intercepting terrorist financing. It reaches that conclusion
after examining the current state of United States money laundering
regulation, the changes wrought by the Patriot Act, and the realities of
terrorist financing.

II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN MONEY LAUNDERING LAW

Money laundering is nothing new. 24 Our financial and legal systems
have been wrestling with the problem of dirty money for ages. Over the
past thirty years or so we have been trying to find the right balance between
legitimate expectations to financial privacy and legitimate law enforcement
access to financial records.
While money laundering is nothing new, the September 11 attacks put a
new twist on the problem. Our anti-money laundering laws have been
primarily geared toward tracing the proceeds of crime-to stop the drug
dealer or the mob boss from making ill-gotten gains look legitimate. In the
new war against terrorism, however, we expect our money laundering
regime to do something very different-to intercept the financing of
criminal acts. Even with the Patriot Act in place, our financial system is not
set up to handle this new task. To appreciate why, a brief review of existing
money laundering legislation is in order.

24Money laundering has been defined as "the process by which one conceals the existence,
illegal source, or illegal application of income, and disguises that income to make it appear
legitimate." It has become a virtual requirement for large organized crime groups to engage in
money laundering, because it is the sustaining force that enables drug dealers, terrorist groups and
other organized crime units to hide substantial amounts of wealth and to perpetuate further
criminal activity. Kelly Neal Carpenter, Eighth Survey of White Collar Crime: Money
Laundering, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 813, 814 (1993).
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A. The Bank Secrecy Act
The first serious anti-money laundering statute enacted by the federal
government was the Bank Secrecy Acr 5 (BSA), which was passed in 1970.
The BSA requires banks and other "financial institutions,,26 to keep certain
records and authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require such
institutions and persons participating in transactions for such institutions to
report financial transactions to the Secretary.27 The stated policy rationale
for the record-keeping requirements of the BSA is that "suchi·ecords and
reports are of a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and other
regulatory investigations.,,28
The regulations implementing the BSA require covered financial
institutions to report each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency, or
other payment or transfer that involves a transaction in currency of more
than $10,000. 29 The legislation also requires regulated institutions to: (1)
establish internal controls to ensure compliance with the BSA; 2) monitor
the implementation of compliance procedures; 3) designate one or more
individuals as responsible for supervising day-to-day compliance; and 4)
provide training for personnel. 30
It is fair to say that bankers have never much liked the BSA and for
good reason. Compliance with the law is very technical and detailed. The
paperwork requirements on banks can be quite burdensome, especially for
small institutions. Moreover, the failure to accurately report a currency
transaction is a strict liability offense which can lead to forfeiture of funds
even if the error was inadvertent. 3l The Treasury Department can require
officials of depository institutions to appear personally, to produce records
and to testify under oath in connection with a money laundering or
compliance investigation. 32
25 12 u.s.c. §§ 1829(b), 1951-1959 (2003); 31 u.s.c. §§ 5311-5322 (2003).
2631 u.s.c. § 5312(a)(2) (defining "financial institution" to include, among other things,
banks and depository institutions, casinos and card clubs, broker-dealers and investment
companies).
27Id. § 5313(a).
28 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(I); 31 U.S.C. § 5311.
29The regulations promulgated by the Department of Treasury under the Bank Secrecy Act
are found at 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(I) (2002).
3°31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 21.21(c) (2003) (describing minimum requirements for
BSA programs at national banks).
31 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(3)
32/d. § 53 I 8(a)(4).
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In addition to the regulation's burdensome compliance requirements,
bankers soon suspected that the law would be ineffectual in stopping dirty
money from going through the legitimate banking system. As a general
proposition, a substantial percentage of crooks who have more than $10,000
in cash to deposit are clever people; they quickly learned to make small
deposits. The increased regulatory scrutiny of large cash transactions,
resulted in money launderers breaking up their deposits into several
transactions in amounts less than $10,000. This technique of BSA
avoidance became known as "smurfing. ,,33 Banks are now required to
institute compliance procedures to aggregate transactions in order to detect
and prevent smurfing. 34
The development of smurfing made regulators face up to the fact that a
bright line rule based on an arbitrary dollar amount could never be effective
in smoking out criminal activities. This realization led to a change in
money laundering regulation designed to make bankers detect "suspicious"
activities. If a transaction is suspicious it must be reported if, in the
aggregate, $5,000 in funds or other assets is involved. 35
While coverage under the BSA was far-reaching, it was far from
universal. Some financial intermediaries were subject to it, but others were
not. Not all intermediaries that were subject to the BSA were subject to the
same requirements. For instance, Western Union was required to report all
transactions over $3000, but unlike banks, was not required to maintain
records and tracking data.
Again, criminals with large amounts of cash to move are not, generally
speaking, stupid. In time, cash transfer services like MoneyGram and
Western Union became favorite tools of terrorists. 36 These networks move
cash very quickly, and users liked the relative informality-no account to
set up and minimal ID requirements. 37 The Patriot Act has, however,
33See

Bill Atkinson, Treasury Asks Mandatory System To Tighten Laundering Detection, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 7, 1990, at 2 (noting the use of the tenn). One smurfing technique is the
"starburst." In a starburst, tainted money on account in a bank is sent out in random, small chunks
to other accounts all over the world. Tracking it all down wears down investigators, who must
contend with many different jurisdictions to trace small amounts of money. Getting to them
through their money, ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 2001, at 67.
34 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
35 31

C.F.R. § 103. 18(a)(2).

Heather Timmons, Terrorist Money by Wire, BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 94.
Heather Timmons, Western Union: Where the Money is-in Small Bills, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 26,2001, at 40.
36See
37See

2003]

BRINGING OUT THE BIG GUNS

965

changed the attractiveness of non-bank money transfers. In what was
clearly a shot across the bow of the entire industry, New York's banking
regulators brought charges against Western Union alleging violations of
state and federal currency transaction reporting laws. 38 The parties settled
the action with Western Union paying a fine of $8 million without
admitting any wrongdoing. 39

B. Right to Financial Privacy Act
When it was first enacted, the BSA created quite a stir. United States
banking customers were not used to the idea that their banks might be
required to tell the government about certain transactions in which they
engaged. Indeed, the BSA was challenged as an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court declared that the
BSA was constitutional because there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the bank-customer relationship with regard to information
required by the government. 40
To counteract some of the invasive aspects of the BSA, however,
Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (Privacy Act).41
The Privacy Act provides broad coverage for financial privacy, but that
protection is subject to many exceptions. In general, the Privacy Act
prohibits disclosure of an individual42 customer's records by a financial
institution to a government authority without the customer's consent. 43
38Paul Beckett & Carrick Mollenkamp, In Wake of Sept. 11, Regulators Crack Down on
Money-Transfer Industry, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2001, at A9.
39 Paul Beckett & Carrick Mollenkamp, Western Union Tripped by Patriot Act, WALL ST. J., Dec.
20, 2002, at A3.
4{)See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443-45 (1976) (holding there is no Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy in a person's bank records when a government agency has an
interest in examining those records); Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 45-54 (1974)
(holding the Bank Secrecy Act's recordkeeping and reporting requirements do not deprive
financial institutions of due process, nor does the implementation of the BSA constitute an illegal
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
41Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI §§ 1101-1121,92 Stat.
3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422).
42The law protects individuals and partnerships consisting of five or fewer individuals but
does not extend to corporations. 12 U.S.C. § 3401(4) (2003).
43I d. § 3402( 1). Among other exceptions, the Act does not prohibit disclosure in the following
situations: (1) where the financial information is not individually identifiable; (2) where the
fmancial institution itself is being investigated; and (3) where the disclosure is in accordance with
Internal Revenue Code provisions or other federal statutes or rules. Id. § 3413.
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While the Privacy Act makes clear that the government does not have
unfettered access to customer bank accounts, it provides that a customer
may authorize disclosure of financial records to a government authority,
subject to revocation. 44 Despite the broad protection afforded by the
Privacy Act, the government may obtain disclosure without the customer's
consent pursuant to an administrative subpoena, a search warrant, a judicial
subpoena and, in certain circumstances, a formal written request. 45
The Privacy Act attempted to rein in a bit of the invasiveness of the
BSA without completely hobbling law enforcement interests. Therefore, a
customer is ordinarily entitled to notice before disclosure to a government
authority.46 In addition, the customer has the right to challenge the
disclosure. 47 The notice to the customer may, however, be delayed pursuant
to court order if such notice would result in the customer fleeing from
prosecution, the destruction of evidence, the intimidation of potential
witnesses, or would seriously jeopardize an investigation or proceeding. 48
Special procedures govern certain intelligence activities,49 and we might
expect those provisions to be invoked more frequently in the war against
terrorism.

C. The 1980s
With the BSA and the Privacy Act in place by the end of the 1970s, the
cornerstones of the United States scheme were settled and the battle
between legitimate interests in privacy versus legitimate law enforcement
interests was framed. The money laundering reporting scheme received
some fine tuning in the 1980s as policy makers perceived that some
transactions of legitimate interest to law enforcement might be falling
through the cracks. The Money Laundering Control Act of 198650

44[d.

§ 3404(a)(2).

45[d.

§ 3402(2)--(5).

46[d.

§ 3408(4).

§ 341 0 (containing the exclusive judicial challenges available to object to the disclosure
of financial records).
48[d. § 3409.
49[d. § 3414.
47[d.

50Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.).
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established money laundering as a crime, making the United States one of
the first countries in the world to criminalize the practice. 51
In 1988 Congress passed the Money Laundering Prosecution
Improvements Act. 52 The main thrust of this law was to expand the reach
of the BSA by broadening the definition of "financial institution.,,53 It also
introduced the innovation of giving Treasury the power to target the
nation's money laundering compliance program by requiring additional
reporting obligations for certain geographic areas. 54

D. The 1990s
Congress tinkered with the federal money laundering scheme several
times during the 1990s. In 1992, Congress passed the Annunzio-Wylie
Anti-Money Laundering Act,55 (Annunzio-Wylie Act) which further
bolstered the requirements of the BSA. This law required the filing of
"Suspicious Activity Reports" (SARs) that were "relevant to a possible
violation of law or regulation.,,56 SARs were an attempt to fine tune the
money laundering reporting system in light of the fact that a bright line
dollar amount rule or even a requirement to pick up smurfing sometimes
left suspicious transactions unreported.
The unintended consequence of the increased reporting schemes was the
generation of large numbers of extraneous reports. The flood of useless
reports was hardly surprising given the incentives to over-report that are
built into the law. The BSA imposed strict liability for failure to file
appropriate reports. 57 The institutions subject to the BSA took that threat of
51See Steven & Bogle, supra note 17, at 263. The crime of money laundering includes the
practice of structuring transactions in order to evade BSA reporting requirements and generally
prohibits the participation by a financial institution in a financial transaction with knowledge the
funds involved are derived from an unlawful activity.
52Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.
4354 (1988) (codified in various sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.).
5331 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2003).
541d. § 5326(a).
55Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, 102 Pub. L. No. 550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992)
(codified in various sections of 12, 18,31 and 42 U.S.c.).
56 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(I).
§ 5321(a)(3). See United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855-57 (1st
Cir. 1987) (ruling that the bank had the requisite mental state if it deliberately avoided learning
CTR requirements).
571d.
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liability very seriously. On the other hand, there was no liability attached to
filing extraneous reports in good faith.58 Indeed, the Annunzio-Wylie Act
contained a provision holding reporting entities free from liability in
connection with the filing of suspicious activity reports. 59 The Patriot Act
also gives reporting institutions the same protection. 60
In the midst of a rising tide of paperwork, Congress passed the Money
Laundering Suppression Act of 1994,61 which chiefly served to suppress the
number of Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) being filed. The Money
Launering Suppression Act had a short-term effect, reducing the number of
reports filed for a short while, but the effects were not long-Iasting. 62
Today, the combined money laundering rules generate vast oceans of
reports, leaving the government officials responsible for reviewing those
reports drowning in data.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a unit of the
Treasury, estimates that thirty percent of the twelve million currency
transaction reports it received in 2001 were filed unnecessarily.63 In a
statement issued in September 2002, FinCEN said it was going to study the
CTR and SAR systems to find ways to reduce the number of unnecessary

58See Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 589 (5th Cir. 1999) ("If private businesses
were not eligible for immunity from state law claims arising from assisting undercover federal
operations, this would provide a major disincentive to assisting law enforcement and would
undermine the needs and interests of the federal government."); Lopez v. First Union Nat'! Bank
of Fla., 129 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 1997).
59"[Persons reporting suspicious activity] ... shall not be liable to any person under any law
or regulation of the United States ... or ... of any State ... for such disclosure or for any failure
to provide notice of such disclosure to the person who is the subject of such disclosure ...." 31
U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3)(A) (2003). See Stoutt v. Banco Popular de P. R., 320 F.3d 26, 31-33 (1st
Cir. 2003) (upholding summary judgment in favor of bank that filed SAR in connection with a
customer who allegedly obtained funds under fraudulent pretenses on the grounds that the safe
harbor of 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) protects the bank).
60USAPA § 351 (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) (2003)).
61Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2243
(l994)(codified in scattered sections 001 U.S.C.).
620ne of the problems with the Act was that it did not provide a procedure to determine the
legitimacy of offshore bank customer transactions. Several recent legislative efforts have been
directed at this area of concern. See, e.g., Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-310, 112 Stat. 2941,2942-47 (1998) (codified in 31 U.S.C. §§ 5341-42,
5351-52 (2000)).
6JRob Garver & Michele Heller, In Brief FinCEN Seeks Streamlined Filing Process, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 5,2002, at 3 (quoting FinCEN press release).

2003]

BRINGING OUT THE BIG GUNS

969

reports. 64 The concern with over-reporting goes beyond worrying about the
innocent trees that have given their lives in vain and extends to the very
heart of the reporting regime. According to the FinCEN press release,
"These millions of excess forms have little value for law enforcement
purposes and, we believe, impose substantial compliance costs upon
financial institutions.... Also, excess filings burden our intelligence
analysis and impede timely targeting of money laundering, terrorist
financing, and other vulnerable transactions.,,65
This admission by FinCEN calls the whole BSA-style approach to
money laundering into doubt. With the Patriot Act beefing up the reporting
requirements and thereby generating even more CTRs and SARs, could the
reporting system be paralyzed by an overload of, mostly useless,
information?66
The last noteworthy anti-money laundering initiative from the 1990s
was the notorious "Know Your Customer" proposal. In December 1998,
the federal banking agencies jointly proposed rules that would have really
required banks to monitor customer activity.67 In a sense, the regulators
were looking to deputize financial institutions to snoop on customers in
order to figure out who should be watched closely. The 1998 Know Your
Customer proposal would have required financial institutions to determine
the customer's identity, identify the source of customer funds, determine
the customer's "normal and expected" transactions, monitor accounts for
transactions that were not consistent with those expectations, and determine
whether such transactions were unusual or suspicious. 68 In response to the
proposed rules, the federal banking regulators received a flood of comment
letters, most of which opposed the rules. The proposed rules were
64I d
65 I d

66FinCEN has recently developed an electronic filing system, the Patriot Act Communication
System (PACS), that will reduce the paperwork involved in the filing of CTRs and SARs but will
do nothing to reduce the flow of extraneous information. For information about the PACS, see
PACS Homepage, available at http://pacs.treas.gov/index.jsp (last visited Sept. 12,2003).
67Membership of State Banking Institutions in the Federal Reserve System; International
Banking Operations; Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,516
(proposed Dec. 7, 1998) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 211, 225); "Know Your Customer"
Requirements, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,524 (proposed Dec. 7, 1998) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 21) (OCC);
Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, 63 Fed. Reg.
67,529 (proposed Dec. 7, 1998) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 326); Know Your Customer, 63 Fed.
Reg. 67,536 (proposed Dec. 7, 1998) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 563).
68Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,536 (Dec. 7, 1998) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 563).
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withdrawn in March of 1999. 69 That was the last major initiative on money
laundering before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 70
III. THE USA PATRIOT ACT'S IMPACT ON MONEY LAUNDERING

The Patriot Act contains extensive provisions designed to improve the
government's anti-money laundering efforts. The Act not only strengthens
the existing BSA system by expanding the types of financial institutions
covered, but it also vests in the Treasury broad new powers to examine
financial institutions and prohibit suspect accounts. It extends the reach of
the BSA to, among others, credit unions, futures commission merchants,
commodity trading advisors, and commodity pool operators. 7 !
One of the major innovations brought about by the Patriot Act is the
implementation of a new version of the "Know Your Client" standards.
The Patriot Act directs the Secretary of Treasury to promulgate regulations
establishing standards for financial institutions regarding the identity of
customers opening accounts.72 The new Patriot Act regulations require,
among other things, that financial institutions implement reasonable
procedures for: (1) verifying the identity of any person seeking to open an
account, to the extent reasonable and practicable; (2) maintaining records of
the information used to verify the person's identity, including name,
address, and other identifying information; and (3) determining whether the

69The FDIC received 254,394 comments with the "overwhelming majority" strongly opposed
to the proposed standards. 64 Fed. Reg. 14,845 (Mar. 29,1999) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 326).
7°Despite all of the anti-money laundering provisions of United States law, money laundering
activity has reached astounding levels. By some estimates, it is the world's third largest industry
by value. Current estimates are that $500 billion to $1 trillion in criminal proceeds are laundered
through banks worldwide each year, one-half of that amount moved through domestic financial
institutions. See MINORITY STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTE ON INVESTIGATIONIS, 106TH
CONG., REpORT ON PRIVATE BANKING AND MONEY LAUNDERING: A CASE STUDY OF
OPPORTUNITIES AND VULNERABILITIES, available at http://www.govaffairs.senate.gov/; see also
Bill Steel, Billy's Money Laundering Information Website, available at www.laundryman.u
net.com/printversion/homepage.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
71USAPA § 321 (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2003» (amending the
existing definition of "financial institution").
12/d. § 326(a) (codified as amended in 31 U.S.c. § 5318(1) (2003»; Customer Identification
Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, and Credit Unions, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,290-01 (July 23,
2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 21); Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Customer
Identification Programs for Certain Banks (Credit Unions, Private Banks and Trust Companies)
That Do Not Have a Federal Functional Regulator, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,299-01 (July 23,2002) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
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person appears on any lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist
organizations provided to the financial institution by any government
agency.73 Prior to the Patriot Act, banks were required to know their
customer in only three specific situations: (1) to "verify and record the
name and address of the individual presenting a transaction" when a CTR
filing was required;74 (2) when customers purchased certain monetary
instruments, such as cashier's checks and money orders/ 5 and (3) in certain
wire transfers. 76 Now presumably every customer is subject to the rules.
The Patriot Act also prohibits financial institutions from maintaining or
administering correspondent accounts with unaffiliated foreign shell banks
(i.e., banks with no physical offices or branches).77 It requires financial
institutions to take reasonable steps to ensure that a correspondent account
maintained or administered by a financial institution in the United States is
not being used indirectly to provide services to a foreign shell bank.78
The Patriot Act beefs up the BSA's requirements for institutions to
maintain formal anti-money laundering programs. In a nutshell, it requires
financial institutions to establish anti-money laundering programs
commensurate with the size, location, and activities of the financial
institutions. 79 While this is nothing new for banks, because they have been
obligated to maintain these programs since 1987,so it has had a huge impact
on non-bank financial institutions, such as broker-dealers and investment
compames.
Among other things, the Patriot Act requires financial institutions to
establish due diligence policies and procedures to detect suspected money
laundering through correspondent accounts and private banking accounts of
foreigners. It also gives the Secretary of Treasury authority to impose
"special measures" on financial institutions with respect to foreign
jurisdictions, financial institutions, transactions or accounts that the
Secretary determines to be a "primary money laundering concern."SI These
73 USAPA § 326(a)(2).
74 31 C.F.R. § 103.28 (2001).
75 31 U.S.C. § 5325(a) (2000); 31 C.F.R. § 103.29.
76 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(e)-(f) (2001).
77USAPA § 313(a) (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 5318(j)(1) (2003)).
78 .
Id
79Id.

§ 352(a)-(c).

8°31 U.S.C. § 5318(h).
81 USAPA § 311 (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(c)(I) (2003)). As of this
writing, two countries have been identified as being of "primary money laundering concern":
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special measures could include requiring the bank to: (1) maintain
additional records or make additional reports in connection with specific
transactions; (2) identify the foreign beneficial owners of certain accounts;
(3) identify the customers of a foreign bank who use interbank
"payable-through" accounts; (4) identify the customers of foreign banks
who use interbank correspondent accounts; and (5) restrict or prohibit the
opening or maintaining of certain interbank "payable-through" or
correspondent accounts. 82
With all this information, the Patriot Act also establishes a host of
provisions designed to encourage, or in some cases compel, the sharing of
information among financial institutions, regulators and law enforcement
authorities. 83
Finally, the Act strengthens the sanctions for failure to comply with the
money laundering provisions by: (1) requiring federal banking agencies to
consider a financial institution's record of combating money laundering
when reviewing applications in connection with a bank merger or
acquisition;84 (2) subjecting financial institutions to civil and criminal
penalties of up to $1 million for violations of the Patriot Act's money
laundering provisions;85 and (3) authorizing the Secretary to require a U.S.
correspondent bank to sever correspondent banking relationships with a
foreign bank that fails to comply with or contests a U.S. summons or
subpoena.
Ukraine and Nauru. See Press Release, Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet Regarding The
Treasury Department's Use of Sanctions Authorized Under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act
(Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/presslre1eases/po3711.doc; see also OCC
Bulletin, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Notice of Designation-Designation of Nauru
and Ukraine as Primary Money Laundering Concerns (Dec. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftplbulletinl2002-47.txt. In addition to the two countries officially
designated as "primary money laundering concerns," thirteen other nations have been identified
by FinCEN as "noncooperative 'in the fight against money laundering''': The Arab Republic of
Egypt, Burma, The Cook Islands, Dominica, The Federal Republic of Nigeria, Grenada, Israel,
Lebanon, The Marshall Islands, Niue, The Philippines, The Russian Federation, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Vincent and The Grenadines, and The Seychelles. See Advisory Letter, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, United States Department of Treasury FinCEN Advisories 28
through 32 (June 6, 2003) available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisoryI2002-5.txt.
82 US APA § 3 I I (b) (codified as amended in 3 I U.S.C. § 5318A(b) (2003)).
83Id. § 356(b); Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing
Procedures To Deter Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,579 (Sep. 26,
2002) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
84 US APA § 327(b)(1)(B) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(11) (2003)).
8sId. § 363 (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 532 1(a)(7), 5322(d) (2003)).
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Ironically, although the Patriot Act was intended to strengthen the
anti-money laundering regime, the new reporting sanctions may exacerbate
the over-reporting problem that regulators have battled through the 1980s
and 1990s and thereby make the system less effective. In passing the
Patriot Act, Congress recognized that over-reporting could have a
detrimental effect on the usefulness of the information in promoting law
enforcement, and therefore directed the Treasury Department to study ways
to expand the exemptions from filing CTRs or to increase the utilization of
the currently existing exemptions from filing. 86
Even with this effort to reduce the number of extraneous filings,
however, it seems likely those initiatives will be outweighed by other
incentives in the Patriot Act to over-report. In addition to the harsh
sanctions for non-compliance imposed by the Patriot Act, the new law also
extends the safe harbors for filing SARs. 87 So with potentially large
sanctions for noncompliance, coupled with a safe harbor for over-reporting,
financial institutions are likely to err on the side of filing.
Having laid out the broad outline of existing law and the changes made
to that scheme by the Patriot Act, we now tum to the question at hand: will
this legislative scheme actually intercept the terrorist funding that it targets?

IV.

WHY THE NEW PROVISIONS WON'T DISRUPT TERRORIST
FINANCING

Given the legal background, it should be obvious that the task of
intercepting terrorist financing stands our system of money-laundering on
its head. The job of implementing the plan falls to the FinCEN, an agency
in the Department of the Treasury. Since its inception, FinCEN's mission
has been to trace the proceeds of crimes such as drug trafficking. Proceeds
of crimes are somewhat easier to follow than terrorist funds because law
enforcement works backwards from the crime itself. In terrorist cases,
however, law enforcement is supposed to intercept the funds before a crime
occurs. James Sloan, FinCEN director, has called terrorist financing
"almost money laundering in reverse. ,,88

§ 366(a)(3), (b).
87/d. § 351 (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 53 18(g)(3) (2003)).
88 Scott Bernard Nelson, The Money Trail, War on Terrorism Gives Financial Crimes Unit
New Stature, Challenges, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5,2001, at Fl, available at LEXIS, News Library
(quoting James Sloan, FinCEN director)
86/d.
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In the post-Patriot Act world, FinCEN acts as a clearinghouse for all this
financial data. Sifting through and making sense of all the financial data
that comes to FinCEN is a herculean task and one which has not been
successfully executed in the past. While it may be possible for FinCEN to
rise to the challenge by employing state-of-the-art data mining techniques
and predictive technology like that currently used in the private sector,89
much depends on whether FinCEN will have the personnel and resources to
implement such a sophisticated arrangement. If the past is any guide,
however, FinCEN might very well become the handmaiden of the much
more powerful Internal Revenue Service.
Even if FinCEN gives terrorist financing interception its best effort,
consider what it is up against. Let us assume the next terrorist attack is
another surprise on the scale of the September 11 attacks. With the benefit
of hindsight, some observers suggest that the September 11 attacks could
have been predicted if intelligence agencies had merely been able to
"connect the dots.,,9o Unfortunately the problem is not as simple as
connecting dots, it is more a problem of figuring out which dots to connect.
The intelligence agencies are flooded with information, the vast majority of
which is worthless. If we add a torrent of financial transactions information
to the mix, we may exacerbate the information overload problem. As a
thought-experiment let us consider the following: if FinCEN had been
looking to interrupt the September 11 attacks, for what would it have been
looking?

A. Terrorist Attacks Are Not Expensive to Fund
Examination of the bank accounts of the nineteen suspected September
11 terrorists have given investigators an idea of how much the terrorist
attacks COSt. 91 In May 2002, the Wall Street Journal reported the results of
89See Mike France et aI., Privacy in An Age o/Terror, Bus. WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 83-84.
The phrase "connect the dots" is one employed by Senator Richard Shelby, R-AL, Vice
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in his separately stated views to the
official report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on their Investigation into the
Terrorist Attacks of September II, 2001. See September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the
U.S. Intelligence Community, Additional Views of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, at 5, (Dec. 10, 2002), available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/shelby.pdf.
91 The September II, 2001, terrorists opened twenty four basic checking accounts at four
different banks in the United States with the value of the accounts averaging between three and
four thousand dollars. All accounts were opened at large, well-known banks because of the
90

2003]

BRINGING OUT THE BIG GUNS

975

an FBI investigation that showed the operation was essentially run on a
shoestring. The FBI concluded very precisely that the operation had cost
$303,672. 92 That is not a lot of money. That small amount would be very
hard to detect in our economy where many billions of dollars change hands
every day-$300,000 is not even a rounding error.
To make things even more complicated, it is obvious that the whole
$300,000 did not move through the financial system all at once. The
transactions that funded the hijackers' bank accounts were quite innocuous.
Not surprisingly, the bank accounts were funded primarily with cash-47%
of the total-wire transfers made up thirty four percent of the funds
deposited, eight percent came from travelers checks and the remainder
came from miscellaneous sources, including checks from individuals. 93
Cash was also the preferred way for the terrorists to pay for things. All
of these transactions were quite routine and in no way would have triggered
any suspicion. The law can require all the reporting in the world, but it is
very easy to move around cash the way the terrorists did without generating
any concern.
Not only are the amounts small and the transactions ordinary, but the
sources of the funds are hard to track in any event. While investigators
think they have a good idea about how much money was involved in the
September 11 attacks and how it was used, they still do not know from
where the money came. It appears that the money was generated by a
number of methods including the sale of honey.94 The cash generated by
these activities was then carefully (and slowly) moved by wire transfer from
foreign bank accounts to United States accounts held by the hijackers.
While it seems unlikely that the Patriot Act regime would have detected
the September 11 transactions, some argue that the expansion of the cash
transaction reporting required by the Patriot Act could actually hinder
criminal investigations. These concerns are summed up in a comment from
Brad Jansen, the deputy director of technology policy for the Free Congress
Foundation, a conservative think tank in Washington: "The effect of
anonymity that a customer may maintain at a large institution. See Cliff Stephens & Tom Crook,
Pressure From All Sides, BANK SYS. & TECH., Oct. 7, 2002, available at
http://www.banktech.com/story/BNK20021 007S0002.
92 Paul Beckett, Sept. 11 Attacks Cost $303,672, But Few Details ofPlot Surface, WALL ST. J.,
May 15, 2002, at B4.
93 d.
I
94Judith Miller & Jeff Gerth, A Nation Challenged: Honey Trade Said to Provide Funds and
Cover to Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,2001, at AI.
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expanding these requirements is to make the haystack bigger. It is not more
finely tuning law enforcement tools. It is basically throwing more
paperwork at [investigators] without benefit.,,95 The art of intelligence
gathering has always hinged on the ability of analysts to separate the wheat
from the chaff, or to find the useful signal hidden in the distracting noise of
information. Adding more noise is unlikely to make that task easier.

B. The Sources of Terrorist Funding Are Hard to Identifo
Another challenge facing United States law enforcement officials is
identifying the sources of funds that cause serious concern. The money
going into a terrorist's bank account does not necessarily come from a bad
source. An important source of funds for the terrorists is the apparently
legitimate businesses run by the network-travel agencies, road
construction companies, and Internet firms. 96
Complicating the picture is the fact that a significant portion of terrorist
funding seems to be coming from charities. 97 Giving alms to charity is one
of the central tenets of Islam. There are many charities that support
Muslims around the world. Some of the recipients of the charitable largesse
might be involved in terrorist activities, although it is extremely difficult to
assess whether the charities are making the transfers with the intention of
supporting terrorism. 98
The same holds true for individual

95Jeremy Quittner, Gauging the New Law's Consumer Impact, AM. BANKER, Apr. 23, 2002,
at 11 (quoting Brad Jansen).
96See, e.g., Jerry Guidera & Gary Fields, Hamas Official, Relatives Face U.S. Charges in
'War of Audits,' WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2002, at AS (discussing InfoCom Corp. of Richardson,
Texas, a computer and Internet firm identified by the Justice Department as a source of terrorist
financing); Glenn R. Simpson, Intricate Web: Tracing the Money, Terror Investigators Run Into
Mr. Qadi, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2002, at Al (listing a charity, real estate company and chemical
business as sources of funding for terrorists).
97The Iceberg Beneath the Charity-Charities as the Source of Terrorist Finance,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 15,2003, at 67 (reporting that "[p]eople trying to track down al-Qaeda's money
believe that charities are terrorists' biggest source of money.").
98Given Islam's emphasis on paying alms for the poor, finding that some donated money ends
up in the hands of terrorists should not be a complete surprise. At the end of 2002, for example, it
was revealed that the wife of the Saudi ambassador to the United States had donated money to a
supplicant who in tum gave that money to two of the September 11 hijackers. See Susan Schmidt
& Mike Allen, FBI Probes Donations From Saudi; Money From Envoy's Wife May Have Aided
Hijackers, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at AI; see also Glenn R. Simpson, Al Qaeda List Points
to Saudi Elite, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 18, 2003, at A7 (describing a cache of documents seized in
Bosnia allegedly showing how Saudi Arabia's richest and most influential families were among
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philanthropists-finding links to terrorists is easy, but establishing the
intent is difficult. 99 Of course, it is worth noting that the term "terrorist"
itself is hard to define, making the identification of terrorist groups even
more problematic. One person's "terrorist" is often another person's
"freedom fighter."loo
Two Chicago area charities, Benevolence International and Global
Relief Foundation, were raided by Treasury agents in December 2001. 10 1
Global Relief was targeted on the basis of a suspected link between its
director and high-ranking Al Qaeda officials. 102 Global Relief claims the $5
million it raised in 2000 paid for food, health care, and other emergency
services in Afghanistan, Chechyna, Kosovo, Lebanon, Pakistan, and the
West Bank.103 A problem these international charities face is that their
funding is often most necessary in international hot spots, where it is hard
to tell the rebels from the victims from the terrorists.

C. Terrorists Move Money Through Hard-to-Regulate Non-Bank
Channels
Even if the reporting requirements of the Patriot Act work perfectly, the
new law still will not be effective to intercept terrorist financing because
terrorists do not have to use banks to move money. The lynchpin of our
existing money laundering scheme is the conventional banking system. We
count on bankers to file CTRs and SARs because bankers are subject to a
rigorous regulatory scheme and they know they will get into trouble if they
do not comply with the law. Terrorists, however, do not necessarily rely on
the banking system to move money because they have access to other
reliable ways to transfer funds around the world.
The Islamic world is tied together financially by a traditional banking
system known as the hawala. 104 These ancient networks of settling
the fIrst supporters ofOsama bin Laden).
99Keith Johnson, Reasonable Doubt? Mapping the Trail of Terror Money Proves Daunting,
WALL ST. J., May 15, 2003, at AI.
looThe United States has supported over the years many groups that might be considered
terrorists by others. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 7-S.
IOIHanna Rosin,
Raids Offices of 2 Muslim Charities; Groups Accused of Funding
Terror, WASH. POST, Dec. 16,2001, at A2S.
102 Dan Eggen & Kari Lydersen, In Michigan, Anti-Terrorism Effort Goes Public; Haddad
Campaign, WASH. POST, May 6,2002, at A3.
Case Forces Rare Glimpse ofSecret
103 Id.

u.s.

u.s.

104For

a tidy summary of the hawala banking system, see Alan Lambert, Organized Crime,
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payments have deep roots in Islamic culture. They are essentially based on
trust, and involve no physical transfer of funds. For example, a hawala
broker in one country instructed by his client arranges for a broker in
another country to make a payment to the intended beneficiary. \05 Such
informal systems are not designed to deal with official transactions; instead,
they provide complete confidentiality and no paper trail.
Given the pervasiveness of the hawala system and its informality, law
enforcement officials find it difficult to use the hawala network to fight
crime. In India, Pakistan, and the Middle East where these systems are
common, they create significant money laundering problems. One big
problem they present is the difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate
transactions and those involving money laundering. lo6
In the aftermath of September 11, the United States and other nations
froze a Dubai based hawala called "AI Barakaat.,,107 This action made
headlines and significant sums were impounded, but one wonders what
effect it had on terrorist operations. \08 These networks are highly adaptive
entities and if currency transfers are targeted by law enforcement, they may
very well change tactics. If need be, the funds to be transferred are paid in
jewelry to the brokers, who later rationalize their own inter-banking levels
and fund flows amongst themselves. 109
The Patriot Act ostensibly applies to hawala banking,IIO but
enforcement will be difficult. FinCEN has identified a strategy for dealing
with hawalas:

Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas, Underground Banking and Finance of
Terrorism, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 9, 12-19 (2002).
105Cheap and Trusted, ECONOMIST, Nov. 24, 2001, at 71.
I06 In a bit of an ironic twist, the United States government has found that the only effective
way to transfer funds into Afghanistan to aid in its reconstruction is to use the existing hawala
banking system because no other financial infrastructure exists in that devastated region. See
Michael M. Phillips, Afghan Aid Flows Through Dark Channels, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at
A4.
I07 Glenn R. Simpson et aI.,
Intensifies Financial War On Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Nov.
8,2001, at A3.
108 Christopher Cooper & Ian Johnson, Ongoing Concerns: Money Network Tied to Terrorism
Survives Assault, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2002, at AI.
I09Cheap and Trusted, supra note 105, at 71.
lloUSAPA § 359 (amending 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R) to include any "person who engages
as a business in an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a
business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the
conventional financial institutions system").
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Our strategy is (1) to force terrorist financiers to reduce
reliance on hawala and similar systems and to channel their
money into more transparent, formal financial transactions;
(2) to regulate hawaladars so that legitimate hawaladars
comply with financial reporting structures; and (3) to target
the illegal use of hawala for intensive investigation. III
Although this approach is laudable, it sounds like a true clash of
cultures. Given the long history of hawala banking, its informality, its
secrecy, and its deep roots in Islam, it seems unlikely that hawala bankers
will be enthusiastic in their compliance with the new law.
More
importantly, the law might never be enforced against the hawala because
the identities of the hawala bankers are difficult to establish. Without
knowing who is participating in the hawala, the regulatory scheme will be
ineffective. I 12

D. Interactions with the Underground Economy
Another factor that makes tracking terrorist funding difficult is that
much of it comes from activities of the underground economy which are
already off the radar screen. Of course, this is the strongest argument for
using the existing money laundering machinery to intercept terrorist
financing.
Some observers of the international money laundering scene have noted
that just as separate organized crime groups work together toward common
ends-for example, the Russian "Mafia" and Colombian drug cartels-so
too are terrorists and organized crime groups working together. ll3 Terrorist
groups, for example, have been implicated in the international narcotics
trade. I 14

IIIU.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2002 NATIONAL MONEY
LAUNDERING STRATEGY 22 (July 29, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov.
112See Lambert, supra note 104, at 15.

Money Laundering and Business Crime (Proximal Consulting, Geneva, Switzerland), Oct.
2001, at 4, available at http://www.proximalconsulting.com/NewslettersPDFlNewsletter9.pdf.
114See, e.g., Barry Meier, A Nation Challenged:
Drugs; Most Afghan Opium Grown in
Rebel-Controlled Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at B5; Tim Golden, A Nation Challenged:
War and Drugs; Afghan Ban on Growing of Opium is Unraveling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at
Bl.
113
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The global economy presents opportunities for both criminals and
terrorists, and both groups have been savvy to exploit those opportunities. I 15
Unfortunately, the sophistication of the bad guys always seems to be a few
steps ahead of the cooperation of the individual countries in thwarting
money laundering. One senior law enforcement official summarized the
problem in these words: "[Money laundering] is a phenomenon that
respects no borders. The organized crime groups and the terrorist
organizations are far more attuned to the realities of the globalist century
than Western governments are.,,116

E. Alternative Sources a/Wealth
Yet another problem confronting counter-terrorism experts is that
terrorists do not necessarily rely on currency transactions to move wealth
from place to place. Some experts believe, for instance, that the recently
beefed-up money laundering laws may only serve to force terrorists back to
old-fashioned conduits of wealth transfer such as gold bars.ll7
As an example, there is substantial evidence that the terrorists have used
the gem tanzanite, which is mined only in a remote comer of Tanzania, as a
method for storing and transporting wealth. I 18 The trade in the gem has
been in large part taken over by Islamic extremists. 119 As a result of the
link to terrorist financing, a number of United States jewelers now refuse to
carry tanzanite jewelry. 120
115 For example, narcotics traffickers have acquired real property with monetary instruments
that they purchased in structured amounts, under $10,000, and have also laundered cash proceeds
by exchanging them for checks from a real estate company. See Molly McDonough, Real Estate
Lawyers Could Be Watchdogs, 2 A.B.A J. E. REp. 17 (May 2, 2003). If narcotics traffickers have
figured this out, it is likely terrorists have as well. To illustrate, in United States v. High,
prosecutors alleged a real estate company took $35,000 in tainted cash on two different occasions,
each time converting the money into five separate cashier's checks to make down payments on
property. 117 F .3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1997). The balance was paid in cash at the realty office.
Id.
ll~oney Laundering & Business Crime, supra note 113, at 4 (quoting unnamed senior
official at an international law enforcement agency).
l17Moving Target, ECONOMIST, Sept. 14,2002, at 72.
118See Robert Block & Daniel Pearl, Underground Trade:
Much-Smuggled Gem Called
Tanzanite Helps Bin Laden Supporters, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,2001, at AI.
119Glenn R. Simpson & Robert Block, Diary Offers More on Tanzanite, Al Qaeda Link,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2002, at B I.
I20See Jerry Markon, Gemstone Dealers Named in Suit Over Sept. 11, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15,
2002, at Bl.
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The diamond trade may present an even more difficult situation.
Tainted diamonds used to finance terror are said to come from mines
controlled by various African rebel groups where the gems are mined with
slave labor and sold into the black market to fuel ongoing political strife. 121
The new rules put out by the Treasury Department would require dealers in
precious metals, stones, or jewels to comply with the money laundering
provisions 122 as well; again, we will see how effective that is. Like the
hawalas, the diamond business is subject to its own informal rules of
conduct laid down through long-standing norms of behavior. Top-down
regulatory edicts are unlikely to enjoy widespread voluntary compliance.

IV. LIVING WITH THE PATRIOT ACT
The Patriot Act, with all of its shortcomings, is nevertheless the law of
the land. Even if the prospects for intercepting terrorist financing are dim,
financial institutions nevertheless must comply with the law. One can
anticipate some problems in applying the law to specific situations. Several
obvious problems remain to be resolved.
First, how exactly does one go about knowing one's customer? The
federal banking agencies have promulgated a regulation to implement the
Knowing Your Customer ("KYC") provisions of the Patriot Act that require
the gathering and verification of certain key items of information. 123
Although the regulation permits the use of documents to verify the
information provided, it recognizes that documents alone may not be
available, or if available, not sufficiently reliable in some cases. 124 We do
not have any kind of official identity documents in this country. Birth
certificates are notoriously non-uniform, yet drivers licenses are based on
birth certificates, as are passports. 125 In addition, the regulations were
watered down at the last minute at the urging of the financial services
121See Joseph Kahn, A Nation Challenged: The Money Trail; House Votes to Combat Sale of
Diamondsfor War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B6.
122
31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(N) (2003).
123See Customer Identification Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit Unions and
Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,090 (May 9, 2003) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 21, 208, 211, 326, 563, 748, and 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
124Customer Identification Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit Unions and
Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. at 25,099-100 (discussing 31 C.F.R.
§ 103. 121(b)(2)(ii)(A)).
125Thomas P. Vartanian, Proposed ID Regs Pose Challenges, AM. BANKER, Ju!. 19,2002, at
6.
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industry so that banks and other financial intennediaries are not required to
keep copies of the documents they rely on m establishing customer
identity. 126
Terrorists are very good at identity theft, identity cloning, and
impersonating legitimate people. 127 Even without manipulating identity
documents, terrorists can get around the rules by accessing the financial
system through a corporate shell-making it difficult for the financial
institution to really know who is the beneficial owner of the entity they are
dealing with in the transaction. 128 Alternatively, terrorists may fly under the
radar of the KYC rules by using various "back door" techniques for
establishing accounts. 129
Bankers are skeptical that the new requirements will make any
difference in apprehending terrorists. 130 What identification verification is
really about in today's business world is producing enough evidence to
allow someone to conclude that it is more likely than not that you are who
you say you are. Complicating the process of customer identification and
comparison to the watch list is the ever-present problem of transliterating
Arabic names into English. 131 There may be real initiatives toward
biometrics or national ID's, perhaps with some kind of coded infonnation
that would tie into a national database, but those developments are still in
the future. While the KYC regulations quixotically try to trap terrorists
who are exceptionally adept at sidestepping identity problems, the
regulations may have the unintended consequence of stifling legitimate
innovation in other payment processes, such as on the Internet, where the

126See Glenn R. Simpson, Legislator Calls New Bank Rule Lax,

WALL ST. J., May 27, 2003,

atA5.

127 See Vartanian, supra note 125, at 6 (noting that the September 11 hijackers opened 35
deposit accounts using illegitimate social security numbers without being detected).
128See Shell Games, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2002, at 69.
129Gus Blanchard, Go Beyond Patriot Act and Close Back-Door Access to Accounts, AM.
BANKER, July 19,2002, at 7.
1301n the words of Richard Small, director for Global Anti-Money Laundering for Citigroup,
"'For someone to suggest that we'll pick up terrorists,' through such measures, 'scares me
tremendously.'" See Steve Cocheo, Dousing Terrorist Funding: Mission Possible? A.B.A.
BANKING J., Aug. 2002, at 40.
131The experience with the "No Fly List" holds lessons for the financial services industry.
Rendering names written in Arabic script into the Roman alphabet is an inexact science. In
addition, how the name is translated varies considerably from one Arab country to the next. See
Ann Davis, Boarding Impasse: Why a "No Fly List" Aimed at Terrorists Often Delays Others,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2003, at AI.
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barriers to identifying the parties with certainty are high and the costs of the
transactions are small. 132
A second major problem with the Patriot Act concerns the clash
between its provisions, the provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act
of 1978,133 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of
1999. 134 Specifically, section 314 of the Patriot Act-which authorizes the
sharing of customer information between financial institutions, regulators,
and law enforcement agencies-could render the protections afforded by
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 ineffective and diminish the
effectiveness of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999's privacy provisions,
which prohibit the sharing of customer information between financial
institutions for marketing purposes.
In the words of Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff in
testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, "the principal provisions
of the Right to Financial Privacy Act no longer apply to letter requests by a
government authority authorized to conduct investigations or intelligence
analysis for purposes related to international terrorism.,,135 As Chertoff
understands the Patriot Act, law enforcement officials investigating terrorist
activities no longer have to file a subpoena when requesting bank
records. 136 If the law has changed in this way, banks are placed in a very
awkward position, and should legitimately worry whether the safe harbor
provisions of the Patriot Act will help them avoid liability for violations of
the Privacy Act.
The Patriot Act calls for information sharing between the financial
services industry and the government. 137 In order to share the information,
the bank must first be certified. 138 Some banking observers suggest that
132 See Yochi J. Dreazen, Money Transfers:
Too User Friendly? Legislation Aimed at
Stopping Terrorism Could Have a Devastating Impact on an Innocent Bystander: PayPal, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 21,2002, at R9 (describing the impact of the Patriot Act on the Internet payment
system PayPal, whose average payment is $57 and whose service is designed to make transfers as
simple and as low-cost as possible).
133 pub. L. No. 95-630,92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422).
134 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12,15,16 and
18 U.S.C.).
I3SRob Garver, Will USA Patriot Act Prove a Recipe for Trouble?, AM. BANKER, Apr. 23,
2002, at 10 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertofi).
I 36Id.

I37 U SA PA § 314(a).
138See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, available at http://www.fincen.gov/fijnfoap
pb.html (last visited Sept. 19,2003).

984

BAYLOR LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 55:3

bankers will feel a pressure to voluntarily obtain certification and share
customer information in order to show that the bank is a "good citizen."
That 'good citizen status could come in handy if the institution runs afoul of
the arcane rules of money laundering and is faced with an enforcement
action. 139 On the other hand, the privacy provisions of existing law make
the sharing of customer information without the customer's consent
problematic. 140 Bankers should be worried that once the fear of terrorism
fades, customers will bring suits to assert their traditional rights of financial
pnvacy.
Another unanswered question for financial institutions concerns what to
do with tainted funds if any are discovered. One thing is clear; the
institution cannot deliver those funds back to the bad guys-to do so would
constitute money laundering. The likely course of action is to freeze the
tainted assets. But that only raises a different serious question-how does
the money get unfrozen? When it is unfrozen what happens to it? Does it
go to victims of September II? To the government? To Afghanistan? No
one knows the answer to this question. Experience has shown with the
frozen assets of dictators like Mobutu Sese Seko, that money frozen in
foreign bank accounts is awfully difficult to thaw out. 141
Yet another issue we will have to confront is the appropriate reach of
the Patriot Act. There is a movement afoot in the Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering (FATF) to impose the money laundering
disclosure and reporting requirements on attorneys whose clients are
The FATF is considering
engaging in suspicious transactions. 142
requirements that lawyers identify clients suspected of money laundering,
and that they report suspicious client activity to authorities. 143 The group
says its object is to make it more difficult for money launderers to misuse
the services of a lawyer. Of course, one could also view the requirements
as yet another instance of governmental efforts to disrupt the solidarity of
attorneys and their politically unpopular clients. 144
Cocheo, supra note 130, at 44.
140See 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2000).
141See Roger Thurow, Frozen Terrorist Funds May Not Thaw Easily; Who Gets the Money?,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14,2001, at AI.
142See Rhonda McMillion, Gatekeeper's Burden: Money Laundering Proposals Raise
Concerns About Attorney-Client Privilege, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 72.
143I d.
144 For a general discussion of government efforts to disrupt attorney-client solidarity, see
Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices ofSolidarity: Regulating the Roles ofLawyers for Clients
J39 See
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The ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession,
(ABA Task Force) was created to examine the proposed international
money laundering regulations. The ABA Task Force opposes laws that
would require lawyers to file reports of clients' suspicious transactions. 145
The group does, however, support increased training to help lawyers
identify money laundering, as well as a proposal that would require lawyers
who receive and transfer client funds to verify clients' identities, and keep
records of domestic and international transactions. 146
While the ABA Task Force opposes mandatory reporting, it does not
oppose sharing non-privileged information subject to a subpoena.
Obviously, for United States lawyers, these reporting and disclosure
requirements would pose an intractable ethical conflict. The touchstone of
our system of legal ethics is the preservation of client confidences except in
a few narrow instances. 147 Reporting such transactions could violate the
attorney-client privilege, although the Model Rules state that a lawyer may
disclose client information to the extent reasonably necessary to "comply
with other law or a court order." 148 Any new money laundering
requirements might fall into that category, but the creation of such a
requirement is clearly inconsistent with our tradition. In addition, in most
places, the bar is regulated by the judicial branch, not the legislature,
because lawyers are officers of the court. The imposition of attorney
disclosure rules as a matter of legislative enactment or executive order
could raise difficult separation of powers questions.
Finally, the biggest challenge we face is keeping the Patriot Act in its
place. In the heat of the moment, Congress passed a sweeping law that
curtails some of the freedoms we cherish. Ostensibly, the law was a
response to terrorism, but as the forgoing discussion has shown, the effect
of the money laundering provisions on terrorist financing is tenuous. The
Patriot Act tips the balance heavily in favor of law enforcement when it

Accused a/Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REv. 173 (2003).
145 d.
I
146 d.
I
147See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) (noting that ordinarily lawyers shall
not reveal information, but may disclose information to (I) prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm; (2) to secure legal advice about compliance with the rules of professional
conduct; (3) to establish a claim or defense when being sued by the client; or (4) to comply with
other law or court order).
148 d.
I
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comes to financial transaction reporting. We may live to regret the quick
action Congress took to respond to the terrorist threat.
While at the time of its passage the Patriot Act seemed to be focused on
foreigners, aliens and suspected terrorists, the actual authority the
government gained was much broader: to pursue and gather and look at
and access personal information on all of us in order to find those suspects.
One commentator has referred to the process by which the Patriot Act was
adopted as a "bait and switch" scam. 149 The law is now in place to allow
the government a lot more access to a lot more transactions than we have
previously thought wise. The new money laundering rules will have
limited value in stopping another September 11. On the other hand, they
will be tremendously helpful for the government in putting together cases of
tax evasion. 150
Since the enactment of the Patriot Act, the administration has taken a
series of steps suggesting a deliberate decision to abandon the law
enforcement paradigm for government investigations of individuals in the
United States and substitute an intelligence paradigm that seeks to secretly
gather all information that might turn out to be useful. 151 Although
"[a]lmost every other nation in the world has an internal security agency
that is separate from its law enforcement agency, [and] freed from many
civil liberties' constraints," that approach has not been part of the American
tradition of law enforcement. 152 Florida Democrat Bob Graham, a member
of the Senate Intelligence Agency, expressed concern that there is a
'''fundamental difference' between a law enforcement agency such as the
FBI, which tries to solve crimes, and an intelligence agency which tries to
prevent crimes.,,153
The shift toward an intelligence paradigm has been made without public
deliberation about whether such an approach will in fact be effective in the

supra note 95, at II.
ISO See Glenn R. Simpson, U.S. Tries 'AI Capone' Tax Charges in Some Terror-Financing
Cases, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10,2002, at AI.
ISI Kate Martin, Intelligence. Terrorism and Civil Liberties, HUM. RTS., Winter 2002, at 5,
available at http://www.abanet.org/irrlhr/winter02/martin.html.
IS2Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath o/September 11,25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 441, 447 (2002).
lS3earl Limbacher, Senators Skeptical 0/ FBI's Ability to Fight Terrorism, NEwsMAX.COM,
Dec. 2, 2002, available at http://www.newsmax.com!showinside.shtml?a=20021l2/2/22l707
(quoting Senator Graham). Graham said he does not know whether these two agencies can be
blended together. 1d.
149 Quittner,
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fight against terrorism. "It is not obvious that a dragnet approach to
detaining individuals or an intelligence effort to collect all information,
relevant or not, will be as effective as a focused law enforcement
investigation aimed at identifying, surveilling, and arresting those involved
in criminal activity.,,154 Indeed, traditional techniques of law enforcement
have had some success in tracking down terrorist cells while also respecting
the civil liberties we hold dear.
Law enforcement on its own can perform a valuable contribution to
preventing terrorism by building on their community policing networks to
exchange information with citizens and gather intelligence. A federal office
could assist with the development of regional task forces by providing
experts to assist in the needs assessment, project planning, and training
efforts. Existing anti-terrorist task forces, High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Area (HIDTA) task forces, and regional crime analysis information systems
provide many examples of effective collaboration without obliterating
completely the distinction between law enforcement and intelligence. 155
A good example of the kind of cooperation that respects the traditional
roles of law enforcement and intelligence is the successful disruption of the
Hezbollah tobacco smuggling ring. The investigation of the operation began
in 1996 when Iredell County, North Carolina, authorities noticed people
with out-of-state license plates making large cash purchases from JR
Tobacco, a discount tobacco outlet in Statesville, North Carolina. 156 The
smugglers were purchasing large quantities of cigarettes in North Carolina,
where the excise tax is only 50 cents per carton, and then transporting them
for resale to other states where the excise taxes were much higher. 157 While
this tax-evading smuggling was cause for law enforcement involvement, the
case became much more complicated in 1999 when intelligence officials
joined the investigation after it became clear that the smuggling ring was
supporting the efforts of the militant Hezbollah terrorist groUp.158 The

154Mart in, supra note 151, at 5.
155Local Law Eriforcement's Role in Preventing and Responding to Terrorism, Chuck Wexler,
Police Executive Research Forum, PERF Survey, Oct. 2,2001.
156Hezbollah Denies Involvement, ABC News, July 22, 2002, available at
http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNewslHezbollah00072I.html.
l57 In Michigan, for example, the tax on cigarettes was $7.50 per carton. The smugglers
moved millions of dollars worth of cigarettes from North Carolina to Michigan between 1996 and
1999. Gordon Fairclough, Lebanese Immigrant Is Guilty ofSmuggling, Hezbollah Aid, WALL ST.
J., June 24, 2002, at B4.
158Gordon Fairclough, Alleged Donors To Hezbollah Facing Trial, WALL ST. J., December 3,
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investigation into the cigarette smuggling ring involved local, state, federal,
and international police and intelligence officials. 159 Ultimately, the
ringleader of the smuggling operation was sentenced to 155 years in
prison. 160
While traditional law enforcement and intelligence functions can
produce results in the war on terrorism, the effort and coordination to do so
is tremendous. On the other hand, having the extraordinary powers of the
Patriot Act may be a strong narcotic for law enforcement authorities. It
may very well make their lives easier as they pursue the many non-terrorist
criminals they deal with day in and day out. If the Patriot Act's new
powers only serve to bolster the cases against tax cheats and drug runners,
then when the sunset provisions require the re-authorization of the law in
2005, law makers ought to remember what the Patriot Act was supposed to
achieve and for what it was actually used. Unfortunately, there will be
precious little information available to lawmakers in 2005 to determine the
effectiveness of the Patriot Act's provisions because the law mandates no
reports regarding the provisions' effectiveness. Without the necessary
information about how these broad new powers have been used, Congress
will be unable to evaluate whether they were needed and how they have
been used in order to make an informed decision about whether and how
they should continue. 161 Indeed, before the verdict is in on the efficacy of
the Patriot Act, the Department of Justice has proposed an even more
draconian law enforcement bill, the "Domestic Security Enhancement Act
of 2003," sometimes called "Patriot 11.,,162
People who believe that these provisions go too far, however, can
expect the proponents of law enforcement to say that the new reach of
financial reporting is a good thing and has helped shut down non-terrorist
bad guys. 163 When the debate about re-authorization begins, proponents of

2001, at Bl.
159Jd.
16°Hezbollah

Smuggler Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, March 1,2003, at All.
161 Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA Patriot Act,
Oct. 31, 200 I, available at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/SurveiliancelTerrorism_militias/20011031
_efeusa'-patriot _analysis.
162A section-by-section analysis of the proposed legislation is available at the website of the
American Civil Liberties Union, available at http://www.aclu.orgiSafeandFree/SafeandFree.
163Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) has already introduced legislation that would repeal the sunset
provisions of the Patriot Act and make all of the new powers permanent. The idea faces strong
opposition from many Democrats and even some key Republicans. House Judiciary Committee
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the pre-Patriot Act standards of privacy will find themselves in the
awkward position of advocating in favor of rules that serve to make it more
difficult to build a case against criminals who happen not to be terrorists.
Politically, that will be a tough sell, but the assault on civil liberties has
created some unusual political alliances opposed to the extension of the
Patriot ACt. l64 It should be an interesting battle.

VI. CONCLUSION
As we continue to wage the war against terrorism we must recognize
that using the money-laundering reporting scheme to shut down terrorist
financing is an incredibly ambitious goal and may not be feasible. While
the purported goal of the new anti-money laundering laws may be out of
reach, the law will nevertheless have real consequences for financial
institutions and their customers. Customers have sacrificed a .measure of
privacy to the government, and while the information so surrendered is
supposed to help identify terrorists, there is no prohibition on it being used
by the government for other types of investigations or surveillance.
The balance of power has shifted toward law enforcement in the arena
of financial reporting. Recovering the standards of financial privacy
enjoyed before the enactment of the Patriot Act will be politically awkward.
While in the immediate aftermath of September 11 the Patriot Act may have
had a calming effect on a stunned and frightened populace, upon clear
examination it is frightening in its own right.
The passage of the Patriot Act may have been a response to the
psychology of terrorist warfare in which "bringing out the big guns" is a
way to reassure the citizenry and keep them from panicking. But viewed
another way, the passage of the Patriot Act plays right into the hands of the
terrorists by forcing a reaction in which the target population turns on itself
and allows terror to get the better of them. It is worth considering whether
Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) has already voiced deep reservations about making the
new powers permanent. Sensenbrenner stated that the Department of Justice has not been sharing
enough information with Congress to allow a fair evaluation of how well or poorly the USA
Patriot Act is working. The debate may bring needed attention to the expansion of secrecy and
reduction in government accountability that has occurred under the USA Patriot Act and the
Homeland Security Act. See Permanent Patriot Act, 40MB WATCHER No.8, April 21, 2003,
available at http://www.ombwatch.orglartic1e/artic1eview/1476/11173.
164Paul Magnusson & Lorraine Woellert, Don't Tread on Us: The Revolt Against the Patriot
Act, Bus. WK., May 19, 2003, at 51 (noting that the opposition to the Patriot Act spans the
ideological spectrum).
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in the heat of the moment we have bargained away too much privacy in
order to grasp an elusive law enforcement advantage.

